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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The sole issue presented to this Court on appeal is 
whether the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of Arson 
and Burglary. 
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IN THE SUPREIiE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
CLIFFORD B. SHOWAKER, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Case No. 20688 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Clifford B. Showaker, was charged with 
Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1978), and Arson, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of both charges in a jury trial 
held November 13, 14 and 15, 1984 in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Dean E. Conder, Judge, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by 
Judge Conder on April 12, 1985 to 0-5 years in the Utah State 
Prison for each offense, the sentences to run concurrently. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
At approximately 11:30 p.m. on September 3, 1984, the 
Murray City Fire Department responded to a reported fire at 
Diamond Industrial Fiberglass (hereinafter "Diamond11) located at 
156 West 4800 South (T. 208-09). After the fire was 
extinguished, police and arson investigators determined that that 
the building had been broken into and arson was the cause of the 
fire (T. 234, 300). These facts were not contested at trial, 
therefore, the sole issue was whether defendant committed the 
burglary and arson. 
Defendant had been an employee of Diamond for 
approximately eighteen months when he was fired on June 28, 19 84 
(T. 106) . Immediately prior to being fired, defendant stated to 
Tim Dixon, a good friend and co-worker, that if he were to get 
fired, "he would come back and burn the place down or he would 
get even with them one way or another" (T. 150-51). Defendant 
further stated that he would start the fire in the office of 
either Allen Match or Noel Wiss (T. 151-52). Keith Hall, the 
arson investigator, determined that the fire originated in Allen 
Match1s office (T. 287, 298-300). 
After he was fired, defendant had permission to return 
to the premises the following day to pick up his paycheck and two 
weeks later to pick up his final paycheck (T. 107-08). Defendant 
did not have permission to be on the premises at any time 
subsequent to the date he picked up his final paycheck (T. 56, 
108, 131). However, he returned to Diamond around July 24, 1984 
to complain to the owner about his dismissal (T. 55-56). 
Paul Jacobs, a fingerprint expert employed by the 
Murray City Police Department, discovered a fresh palm print and 
four fingerprints on one of the 55 gallon drums of accellerant 
which had been tipped over (T. 362) . During the early morning 
hours of September 4, 1984, Officer Jacobs lifted the prints and 
compared them with defendant's palm and fingerprints and 
determined that they matched (T. 363-64, 370, 374). Russell Tea, 
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a del ivery driver for the company tha t supplies res in to Diamond, 
t e s t i f i e d tha t he delivered two drums of acetone matching the 
descr ip t ion of the drum containing defendant 's f ingerpr in t s on 
August 29, 1984 (T. 160-61). The drums were unloaded near the 
place where the drum containing defendant 's f ingerpr in t s was 
discovered (T. 162-63, 361-62). Empty ba r re l s are reused, but go 
through an extensive recondit ioning process required by the 
Department of Transportation which involves submerging the bar re l 
in acid and repaint ing the sides and top (T. 179-80, 183-84). 
Richard and Sherry Barbarino, two defense witnesses , 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant l e f t t he i r house on the night of the 
f i r e sometime during the Channel 5 news (T. 405-06, 416-17). 
The exact times varied from 10:20 to 10:40 p.m. (T. 414, 416). 
Murray City Fire Chief Coombs arrived a t the scene of the f i r e at 
11:36 p.m. and estimated i t had been burning approximately 30 to 
35 minutes (T. 225-26). Captain Hal l , the arson inves t iga to r , 
estimated the f i r e burned a t o t a l of 30 to 40 minutes in the room 
of origin (T. 301). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The evidence presented a t t r i a l was suff ic ient to 
support de fendan t s convictions for burglary and arson. 




THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED 
THE OFFENSES OF BURGLARY AND ARSON. 
Defendant contends that evidence presented at trial 
regarding motive, palm print and fingerprint identification, and 
opportunity to commit the crime was insufficient to support the 
jury's determination that defendant committed the offenses of 
burglary and arson. 
The standard recently articulated by this Court for 
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is that the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom will be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict and to set 
aside a jury verdict, the evidence must be "sufficiently 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. 
Rebeterano, 681 p.2d 1265, 1266 (Utah 1984); State yf Garcia, 663 
P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1983). Moreover, it is the exclusive province 
of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence. State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 
1982). 
When viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, 
the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support 
defendant's convictions for burglary and arson. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1978) provides that: 
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A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an 
assault on any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102 (197 8) further provides that: 
A person is guilty of arson iff under 
circumstances not amounting to aggravated 
arson, by means of fire or explosives, he 
unlawfully and intentionally damages: 
• # • 
(b) The property of another. 
Defendant's appeal focuses on the assertion that the 
evidence failed to establish that defendant committed the 
offenses of burglary and arson. However, the State introduced 
evidence that defendant had a motive, that a palm print and four 
fingerprints matching those of defendant were lifted from the 
scene, and that defendant had the opportunity to commit the 
offenses. 
Defendant does not deny making the statements that if 
he were fired he would burn the place down to get even and that 
he would start the fire in Allen's or Noel's office. The trial 
court properly instructed the jury as to the difference between 
intent and motive, that motive is not an element of the crimes 
charged, that presence or absence of motive may tend to establish 
guilt or innocence, and that the jury should assign evidence of 
motive the weight they find it to be entitled (R. 42). See 
People v. Elkhatib, 632 P.2d 275, 279 (Colo. 1981). Therefore, 
because motive is not an element of the offenses charged and need 
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant's challenge to 
the sufficiency of evidence of motive is without merit. 
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Moreover, analys is of the motive evidence presented a t 
t r i a l supports the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . F i r s t , defendant was f i r ed 
from Diamond on June 28, 1984. Secondly, he repeatedly returned 
to Diamond without permission. On one occasion, about a week 
af ter he was f i r ed , defendant was to ld by Allen Match, the 
superintendent at Diamond, t ha t he was not allowed on the 
property and would have to leave immediately (T. 131) . Contrary 
to Mr. Match1s i n s t r u c t i o n s , defendant returned about a week 
l a t e r (T. 108) . 
Approximately one month af ter he had been f i r ed , 
defendant again returned to Diamond to complain about h is 
dismissal (T. 55-56) . F ina l ly , defendant s ta ted to a close 
friend and co-worker tha t if he were f i red he would re turn and 
burn the place down (T. 150-51). 
Defendant's ac t ions and statements made prior to the 
day the f i r e was s t a r t ed support the presence of a motive and the 
weight given to tha t evidence was properly l e f t to the ju ry . 
Therefore, t h i s Court should affirm the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . 
Defendant also contends tha t the palm p r in t and four 
f inge rp r in t s l i f t e d from the scene were not suf f ic ien t to prove 
that defendant committed the offenses charged. Defendant's 
claims are primari ly based on the supposition tha t defendant 's 
p r i n t s could have been impressed upon the bar re l a t a time other 
than the date of the f i r e at Diamond I n d u s t r i a l . 
A summary of the evidence dealing with the palm pr in t 
and f inge rp r in t s reveals t h a t the p r i n t s were l i f t e d from a 
barre l found tipped over j u s t outside Diamond on a loading dock. 
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The p r i n t s were p o s i t i o n e d oi 1 t he b a r r e l cons i s tent with where a 
person would place the ir hand •
 L .^ i \ n : .n the manner i t 
was t ipped over (T. 362 ) . Paul -acobs, - >-- •* • ^ K' n a y 
City with coi i s iderable t ra in ing f ingerprint a n a l y s i s , not iced 
the pr in t s in a f ine layer of dust on the barrel and t e s t i f i e d 
that the pr in t s appeared f resh ("" *65) . Defendant ' s pains print 
and f ingerpr in t s could not have survived the recondit ioning 
process that the barre ls were put through. Diamond has barrels 
del ivered o f ten , empty b a r r e l s a re picked up on a rotating b a s i s , 
and general ly only 4 or 5 barre ls are on the premises at any 
part icu lar time (T. 66-67, 165) . Therefore f the barrel 
conta in ing d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i n t s would not, have s t i l 1 been t h e r e 
from the time defendant was l a s t employed at Diamond, Diamond 
employee had been <-•*• * ::*.• premises on the day p r i o r to t n -; e 
and did - ^ * ^rrels t h a t had been t ipped over nor 
anything in disarray. 
Defendant a l l e g e s a number of remote poss ibi l i t i e s in 
nr e l i lo i t to explain the ex i s t ence of h i s palm print and 
f ingerpr ints on the barrel at Diamond I n d u s t r i a l . He a s s e r t s 
that because Fasco del ivered and picked up ban e l s of r e s i n from 
both Diamond and Star F ire , the company where defendant was 
employed at the time the f i r e occurred, the pr ints might have 
been impressed on t he bar re] a t some time prioi t" September 3 , 
1984, However, t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y ignores the fact that the 
barre l s go through aii ex tens ive recondit ioning process prior to 
being f i l l e d and de l i vered to Diamond. Therefore, a barrel 
picked up from Star Fire would be subjected to an acid 
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flush and repaint ing before i t could be delivered to Diamond and 
f ingerpr in t s could not survive tha t process. 
Defendant points out t h a t the S ta te did not offer a 
witness who could t e s t i f y to the recondit ioning process adhered 
to by other companies supplying Fasco with r e s i n s . However, 
James Chance t e s t i f i e d tha t the acid flush cleaning process and 
repaint ing was required by the Department of Transportat ion 
(T. 179-80, 183-84). 
Based on the foregoing evidence, viewed in a l i g h t 
most favorable to the v e r d i c t , the evidence i s su f f i c ien t to 
support the j u r y f s conclusion tha t the p r i n t s were impressed on 
the bar re l a t the time the crimes were committed. 
Defendant also claims tha t the evidence introduced a t 
t r i a l regarding defendant 's opportunity to commit the crimes was 
insuf f ic ien t to support the j u r y ' s ve rd i c t . However, defendant 
admits tha t the evidence viewed in a l i g h t most favorable to the 
verd ic t e s t ab l i shes t ha t defendant l e f t the Barbar ino 's home at 
10:30 p.m. and the f i r e was s t a r t ed a t 11:00 p.m. or short ly 
t he rea f t e r . (i>££ Appel lant ' s Brief at 23) . This conclusion 
would allow defendant a minimum of 22 minutes to pry open the 
door and se t the f i r e , allowing eight minutes t r ave l time from 
the Barbar ino 's home to Diamond (T. 348). The evidence 
es tabl ished t h a t i t would take a maximum of ten minutes to pour 
the amount of acce l le ran t used to s t a r t the f i r e (T. 70, 88). 
Therefore, defendant had ample opportunity to commit the crimes 
charged. 
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A summary ' ' i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g o p p o r t u n i t y 
e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t had s p e n t t h e day of Sep tember 3 , 1984 
a t a f r i e n d ' s house and l e f t sometime d u r i n g t i . " ' a t - ^v 
(T, 405- 06 , 4] 6 3 ; ) . Mi \ and Mrs. B a r b a r i n o t o l - : a p o l i c e 
i n v e s t i g a t o r f o u r days a f t e r t h e f i r e t h a t d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e i r 
house be tween 10:20 and 10:30 p . m . IT. 4 1 6 - 1 7 ) . The di s t a n c e 
betweei i t h e B a r b a r i n o f s home and Diamond would t a k e about e i g h t 
m i n u t e s t o t r a v e l (T. 34 8 ) . The door t h a t was used t o e n t e r t h e 
b u i l d i n g was l o c k e d wit-h a r l i f lp ho 1 i •• ) . ; ug 
wrench was used t o pry open t h e door (": .. - \ maximum of 2 00 
g a l l o n s of r e s i n and : g a l l o n s of a c e t o n e was s p i l l e d from s i x 
55 g a l l o n drums Vl ) :. : . e s were s t o r e d 
t o g e t h e r in back -.- - t h e door t h a t was p r i e d open and d e f e n d a n t 
knew where e v e r y t h i n g used t o s e t t h e f i r e was s t o r e d (T. 68) . 
Fire.' Chi el' Coombs t h o u g h t t h a t t h e f i r e had been 
b u r n i n g f o r 30-35 m i n u t e s when he a r r i v e d a t 11 :36 p . m . 
2 6 ) . C a p t a i n H a l l , t h e a r s o n i n v e s t i g a t o r , e s t i m a t e d 1I:i» re 
bu rned a t o t a l of 30-40 m i n u t e s i n t h e room of o r i g i n due t o t h e 
a c c e l l e r a n t s t h a t were used (T. 3 0 1 ) . T h e r e f o r e , t h e f i r e was 
s t a r t e d a t 11 :00 p .m. or s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r . 
At minimum, d e f e n d a n t would have had 22 m i n u t e s t o p ry 
t h e door open and s t a r t t h e f i r e . A more r e a s o n a b l e c a l c u l a t i o n 
would have a l l o w e d d e f e n d a n t about 30 m i n u t e s t o s e t t h e f i r e . 
Thus , t h e j u r y f s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o 
commit t h e c r i m e s of a r s o n and b u r g l a r y i s s u p p o r t e d by t h e 
e v i d e n c e and d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n s hou ld t h e r e f o r e be a f f i r m e d . 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h e e v i d e n c e and r e a s o n a b l e 
i n f e r e n c e s drawn t h e r e f r o m , v i ewed i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o 
t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t , was s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t d e f e n d a n t ' s 
c o n v i c t i o n s f o r b u r g l a r y and a r s o n . 
DATED t h i s of F e b r u a r y , 1 9 8 6 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
EARL F. DORIUS " 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
CERTIFICATE QF HAILING 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I m a i l e d f o u r t r u e and e x a c t 
c o p i e s of t h e f o r e g o i n g b r i e f , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t o Lynn R. Brown, 
a t t o r n e y f o r a p p e l l a n t , S a l t Lake L e g a l Defender A s s n . , 333 S o u t h 
Second E a s t , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1 , t h i s Of 
F e b r u a r y , 1986 . 
C^Ztyd -T. <C$^u^Jb- 3>f?J 
- 1 0 -
